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Abstract
In the complex and interconnected post 9/11 world the roles and functions of intelligence have
evolved beyond being a secret capability of governments focused on national security needs.
Intelligence has become recognised as a critical function necessary to support decision making across
the full breadth of government and corporate activity. The concept of an intelligence community
being purely national security centric and bounded by secrecy has become limited. Intelligence in
support of decision making has become a far broader domain than previously believed. This paper
investigates the degree of intelligence embedded‐ness across government agencies and departments
at the federal, state and local levels. Findings reveal that in excess of 75 discrete intelligence
capabilities were identified, categorized by theme before being stratified into a three tier hierarchal
intelligence domain map. Many of these categories were not in support of national security per se,
but rather in support of broader government decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
Intelligence is a function historically associated with national security and defence and for at least
the last 30 years the wider law enforcement domain. However intelligence as a function in the
modern context is embedded in a far broader range of institutions extending beyond national
security and law enforcement to take in governance, compliance and regulation. Moreover the
private sector also utilises intelligence and in many instances maintains in house intelligence
capabilities. In the Australian context there is a clearly defined intelligence community consisting of;
the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the
Australian Geospatial‐intelligence Organisation (AGO) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA).
In addition to those agencies designated as the intelligence community there is a wide range of
agencies in the national security and law enforcement domains that maintain and operate
embedded intelligence capabilities and functions all of which are clearly understood and recognised
as being part of a broader Australian Intelligence Domain. This includes but is not limited to; the
Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service (ACBPS), the various police services and various state based crime
commissions. These organisations would be included for the most part in any serious discourse on
the Australian intelligence domain. However, to limit the discourse on the Australian Intelligence
Domain to this relatively small constituent body ignores a large and operationally diverse element of
the wider Australian Intelligence Domain that exists outside of national security and law
enforcement.
Intelligence is defined in many ways, and it is generally agreed that intelligence refers to a product, a
process or an agency (Treverton, Jones, Boraz, & Lipscy, 2006; Walsh, 2011; Warner, 2002).
However there is no universally accepted singular definition. Definitions may be specific to an
agency for the purpose of delimiting its focus and function. Definitions are also used to exclude the
function from specific environments.
For the purpose of this study intelligence was operationally defined as:
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Intelligence is a label used to identify an agency or function within an organisation tasked
with the collection and analysis of information and subsequent development of intelligence
products to support decision making.
WHY MAP THE AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE DOMAIN?
The intelligence literature is dominated by a discourse focused on two primary areas, national
security and to a lesser extent intelligence in the law enforcement and policing domain (Johnson,
2012; Jerry H Ratcliffe, 2009; Richards, 2010; Warner, 2002). However, in recent years
acknowledgment of a broader intelligence domain has begun to emerge. Gill and Phythian (2006)
argue that the range of actors involved in the intelligence domain has grown to include many
beyond the state whilst failing to articulate exactly whom they refer to in terms of function and
capability. More recently, Walsh (2011, p. 34) has drawn attention to what he sees as the ongoing
evolution of intelligence practice and newly or more recently emerged domains of intelligence
practice citing corrections and bio security as examples. Quarmby and Young (2010) refer to
regulatory intelligence bringing into the intelligence domain, fisheries, taxation and social services
and those public sector organisations with regulatory and compliance functions. For more than 20
years now intelligence practice has been evolving and the contemporary intelligence domain has
grown to consist of much more than the explicitly deemed intelligence community.
Defined intelligence communities are acknowledged in most countries and for the most part
represent the national security intelligence apparatus of government ("Intelligence Services
Legislation Amendment Bill 2011," 2011; Omand, 2010). However the expanding intelligence
domain means an expanding demand for intelligence analysts and intelligence officers. In response
to this increasing demand universities have been establishing a range of intelligence specific
programs at both undergraduate and postgraduate level. In the U.S. approximately 20 universities
operate programs directly supporting the national intelligence community, 10 of those universities
being Centres of Academic Excellence and funded by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) (Breckenridge, 2010; Campbell, 2011). In Australia there are a number of specific
intelligence programs offered at undergraduate and postgraduate level. An example of such a
program is the Edith Cowan University (ECU) Bachelor of Counterterrorism, Security and Intelligence
which aims to specifically prepare students for careers in the broader security and intelligence
domain. However, only a very small percentage of graduates from the program are likely to be
competitive for positions in the deemed intelligence community. Mapping the Australian
Intelligence Domain will assist course planners and graduates to identify potential intelligence career
opportunities beyond those six named agencies constituting the AIC.
The objective of this study was to identify and describe the depth and breadth of intelligence
embedded‐ness in Australian agencies and organisations in order to map the Australian intelligence
domain (AID) beyond the traditionally acknowledged Australian Intelligence Community.
Method
Data to support this research was gathered by interrogating the public organisational charts of
government agencies, supplemented with data gathered from job advertisements collected at
intervals between 2009 ‐2013. Agency organisation charts were accessed via the Australia
Government
portal
at
http://australia.gov.au/directories/australian‐government‐
directories/government‐by‐portfolio between March 2013 and September 2013. Organisation
charts were examined and where the term intelligence was identified with a functional role the
agency or organisation was added to the domain map. Additional data was obtained by accessing
the various government jobs portals such as, https://www.apsjobs.gov.au/ and undertaking job
searches utilising two terms “intelligence” and “analyst” job descriptions were reviewed and in those
cases where the job was an intelligence function the recruiting agency or organisation was added to
the domain map.
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Analysis
Seventy three agencies and functions were initially sorted into ten thematic domains. The ten
domains were; oversight, Australian intelligence community, defence, law enforcement, border
control, anti‐corruption, regulation and compliance federal, regulation and compliance state, other
and education and research. The data was then stratified into a hierarchical model consisting of,
national security, law enforcement and regulation and compliance accordant to the context of their
listing.
A critical limitation to this study was the significant variability of the publically available agency
organisation structures. The high level nature of many of these documents meant that in many
cases no evidence of an intelligence capability could be discerned. Whilst advertisements for
intelligence positions augmented the organisational structure data a complete map of the Australian
Intelligence Domain is not yet possible. Furthermore the change of government and subsequent
structural changes to federal departments has created some short term anomalies in the data.
FINDINGS: DESCRIBING THE AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE DOMAIN
It is assessed that the Australian Intelligence Domain consists of between 75 and 100, possibly more,
agencies and distinct functional areas distributed throughout the architecture of the federal and
states government and in some cases local government. The intelligence focus of these agencies
and functional areas ranges from; national security, law enforcement, anti‐corruption, to regulation
and compliance. In the context of the contemporary security environment there is a significant
crossover and intersection of function and responsibility for security issues that spans all levels of
government. The transnational bisects the national, international overlaps the domestic and the
global intersects with local issues. Moreover there is significant variability in terms of capability,
resourcing and personnel across the domain from the large, well‐resourced and highly focused AIC
community agencies to small cells of one or two individuals. Peripheral to the domain yet relevant is
the oversight function of the AIC undertaken by the IGIS. Also on the periphery but relevant to the
domain are the intelligence discipline areas located in Australian universities and institutions such as
DSTO.
Thematic description of the domain
The rationale for ten thematic domains emerged as the data was being collected, however it should
be acknowledged that it was also significantly influenced by the primary investigators a priori
knowledge of and professional experience in the domain. Data used to inform the themes was
derived from organisational data relating to functions and objectives of the organisation in which the
intelligence capability was situated. This data was then considered within the context of the
literature culminating in the ten thematic domains. A brief description of each thematic domain
follows together with a table listing the agencies determined as being located in the described
thematic domain.
Theme one the Australian Intelligence Community; this thematic domain is the most easily
recognised and clearly bounded domain. Consisting of six agencies with a primary function
collecting and producing intelligence on behalf of and for the Australian government and clearly
defined in legislation ("Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011," 2011).
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Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS); Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO);
Australian Signals Directorate (ASD); Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation (AGO); Defence
Intelligence Organisation (DIO); Office of National Assessments (ONA).
Table One: Theme Australian Intelligence Community

Theme two Defence; this thematic domain is also clearly bounded and consists of the three armed
services, the Defence Department and the Defence Security Agency. Whilst the primary defence
function is war fighting defence maintains and operates significant intelligence assets including
functions, units and roles.
Army; Navy; Air Force; Department of Defence (DoD); Defence Security Agency (DSA).
Table Two: Theme defence

Theme three law enforcement; this thematic domain was more difficult to bound as there are a
variety of agencies that might be described as having law enforcement functions. Having considered
the agencies and functions identified in the data it was determined that this thematic domain would
be limited to the eight federal and state police agencies and the ACC. Each of these agencies has the
primary function of law enforcement and in order to provide that function each agency maintains a
significant intelligence capability. This is also in keeping with the literature where law enforcement
intelligence is more generally examined and written about with in a context of intelligence led
policing or criminal intelligence (Carter, 2005; Jerry H. Ratcliffe, 2008; Jerry H Ratcliffe, 2009;
Sheptycki, 2004)
Australian Crime Commission (ACC); Australian Federal Police (AFP); Qld Police (QPOL);
NSW Police (NSWPOL); Vic Police (VICPOL); Tas Police (TASPOL); SA Police (SAPOL); WA Police
(WAPOL); NT Police (NTPOL).
Table Three: Theme law enforcement

Theme four anti‐corruption; anti‐corruption commissions of various types have been established in a
number of states over the last twenty years. These commissions for the most exist to investigate
and eliminate corruption either in law enforcement agencies or more broadly across government.
This thematic domain is somewhat difficult to bound, given that in some cases these agencies have
also a remit to investigate and prosecute serious crime suggesting that they might have been a fit for
thematic domain three. However given the unique statutory establishment of these bodies they
were incorporated into a singular domain. Eleven agencies have been situated in this domain.
WA Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC); Qld Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC);
Independent Commission Against Corruption NSW (ICAC); NSW Crime Commission (CC‐NSW); Vic
Independent Broad‐based Anti‐corruption Commission (IBAC); Police Integrity Commission NSW
(PIC); Export Finance & Insurance Corporation (EFIC); Integrity Commission Tasmania (IC‐Tas);
Independent Commission Against Corruption SA (ICAC); Australian Commission for Law Enforcement
Integrity (ACLEI).
Table Four: Theme anti‐corruption

Theme five border control; this thematic domain consists of the intelligence functions situated
within three agencies primarily responsible for managing Australia’s borders.
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Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS); Australian Quarantine and Inspection
Service (AQIS); Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP).
Table Five: Theme border control

Theme six consists of the regulatory and compliance functions of government at the federal level.
This domain consists of the intelligence functions embedded in a wide variety of agencies consisting
of 15 federal agencies.
Australian Tax Office (ATO); Australian Sports Anti‐Doping Authority (ASADA); Department of Human
Services (DHS); Office of Climate Control (OCC); Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA);
COMCARE; Department of Employment (DoE); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC); Department of Social Services (DSS); Department of Agriculture (DoA); Australian National
Charity Regulator (ACNC); Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC); Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA); Crimtrac; Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis
Centre (AUSTRAC); Office of Transport Security (OTS).
Table Six: Theme federal regulation and compliance

Theme seven consists of the regulatory and compliance functions of government at the state level.
This domain consists of the intelligence functions embedded in a wide variety of agencies consisting
of 20 state agencies.
Corrections Vic; Corrections NSW; Corrections Qld; Corrections Tas; Corrections SA; Corrections WA;
Court Security WA, Office of the Sheriff NSW; Department of Transport Qld; Department of
Sustainability & Environment Vic; Office of Racing Integrity Vic (ORI‐Vic); Consumer Affairs Vic (CA‐
Vic); Fair Trading NSW (FT‐NSW); Fisheries Vic; Fisheries WA; Department of Health WA; Department
of Finance WA; Office of State Revenue Qld; Mineral Resources Branch NSW; NSW Food Authority.
Table Seven: Theme state regulation and compliance

Theme eight consists of the intelligence functions embedded in three federal agencies that do not sit
logically with any thematic domain space. Those functions are located within DFAT, the DPS and the
Bureau of Meteorology.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS);
Bureau of Meteorology (BOM).
Table Eight: Theme miscellaneous

Theme nine education and research; this is a difficult domain to populate due to the fact that
labelling of education and research relevant to intelligence may not be readily identifiable. At this
point it populated with four universities and the DSTO.
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO); Edith Cowan University (ECU); Charles Sturt
University (CSU); Macquarie University; Murdoch University; Australian National University (ANU);
Canberra Institute of Technology (CIT).
Table Nine: Theme education and research

The final and tenth them is that focused on oversight of the intelligence function and consists of a
single agency, the IGIS.
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Inspector General of Intelligence Services (IGIS).
Table Ten: Theme oversight

Hierarchical stratification
When considering intelligence from a hierarchically stratified perspective three stratums were
identified. At the top of the hierarchy is the national security domain space. The intelligence
literature for the last twenty years has primarily focused on the roles and functions of intelligence
within the national security context. Nationally and internationally investment in intelligence is
principally focused on the national security objective.
Law enforcement intelligence represents the second rung in the intelligence hierarchy. In recent
years this has been demonstrated by the increasing body of literature focused on law enforcement
and policing functions of intelligence. Terrorism and organised crime have helped to lift the profile
of intelligence in the wider law enforcement domain, together with a deliberate move to reduce the
gap between national security agencies and the law enforcement function of government.
At the base of the intelligence domain hierarchy is the compliance and regulatory domain space, this
is still an emergent field only recently coming into the intelligence literature.

National Security

Oversight

Education & Research

ASIS, ASIO, ASD, AGO,
DIO, ONA

IGIS

DSTO, ECU, CSU, ANU,
QUT, CIT, Macquarie,
Murdoch

Army, Navy, Air Force, DoD, DSA
ACBPS, AQIS, DIBP, DFAT, BOM
Law Enforcement
ACC, AFP, NSWPOL, VICPOL, QPOL, SAPOL, TASPOL, WAPOL,
NTPOL
ACLEI, CCC, CMC, ICAC‐NSW, ICAC‐SA, IBAC, PIC, EFIC, CC‐NSW, IC‐
TAS
Regulation & Compliance

ATO, ASADA, DHS, OCC, AFMA, COMCARE, DoE, ACCC, DSS, DoA, ACNC, ASIC, APRA, Crimtrac,
AUSTRAC, OTS, DPS
Corrections x 6, Court Security WA, Office of Sheriff NSW, Tpt Qld, Environment Vic, ORI‐Vic,
CA‐Vic, FT‐NSW, Vic Fish, WA Fish, Health WA, Finance WA, OSR Qld, NSW Food, NSW Minerals

Table Eleven: Stratified intelligence hierarchy

It should be noted this hierarchal stratification of the Australian Intelligence Domain is, in the first
instance, a convenient stratification and is yet to be tested against the views and perspectives of
representatives of the domain space.
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DISCUSSION
Identifying the intelligence functions and organisations operating in the national security and law
enforcement domains spaces is relatively simple. This is due in part to the maturity of the function,
and more often than not it being of sufficient criticality to be identified clearly in the organisational
structure. Moreover intelligence practice in theses domain spaces is well represented in the
literature (Gill & Phythian, 2006; Marrin, 2011; Jerry H Ratcliffe, 2009; Treverton et al., 2006; Walsh,
2011) However, this is not always the case in the regulatory and compliance space. In the
regulatory and compliance domain at both federal and state level there are agencies in which it
might have been expected intelligence functions would be identified yet no evidence emerged. For
example in the area of child protection it might be expected that an embedded intelligence function
would be easily discovered however, this was not the case in any of the state agencies tasked with
responsibility for child protection. In many of the organisations in this domain space the intelligence
function consists of one or two staff often embedded in other functional areas, as such they do not
get identified in publically available organisational structures. Further work is required to acquire
the missing data that will enable a comprehensive domain map to be completed. Notwithstanding
the incomplete nature of the domain map it does provide a baseline for examination of the domain.
IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The number of intelligence functions and capabilities identified as being embedded in such a broad
cross‐section of the federal and state levels of government suggests a need to rethink what
constitutes the Australian Intelligence Domain. It is clear within the Australian context that whilst
national security and law enforcement represent the apex of an Australian hierarchy of intelligence
there is intense growth at the base in the domain of compliance and regulation. This growth at the
base presents challenges and opportunities to a nascent intelligence profession. How to educate
and develop a critical mass of intelligence analysts to populate these emerging capabilities and
functions? Also, how might a community be established in order to maximise opportunities for
collaboration and cooperation across the full breadth and depth of this domain?
Analyst development & education
In a report commissioned by the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Education and
Training on the future of intelligence analysis, Lahneman (2006) identified a crucial need for the
development, education and professionalization of the analytical workforce of the USA. That report,
recommend the utilisation of a national intelligence university system to, ensure that all analysts and
managers meet key education and development goals throughout their career. The USA has long
recognised the need for and role of universities in developing intelligence capacity particularly in the
national security domain space (Breckenridge, 2010; Campbell, 2011; Marrin, 2009). However, in
the Australian context there is no evidence in the literature of a strong professional development
link between the university sector and the national intelligence domain. This may be reflective of a
historically small intelligence domain in Australia. It may also be reflective of the fact that AIC and
defence have always maintained comprehensive in house professional development and training
programs. Law enforcement maintains a limited in house professional development program for
intelligence analysts also. However, professional development in the regulatory and compliance
domain appears to be far more limited, if existent at all. This would appear to suggest an
opportunity for universities both in terms of development of postgraduate professional education
and developing career opportunities for undergraduates seeking to enter the intelligence domain
space. Anecdotal evidence suggests that currently the regulatory and compliance sector depends on
attracting trained personnel from law enforcement and defence.

15

Communities, collaboration and cooperation
An increased awareness of the breadth and depth of Australian intelligence capabilities by exposing
intelligence producers and consumers to a fully mapped intelligence domain may enable better
exploitation of Australian intelligence capacity. Thematic and hierarchical depictions of an
intelligence domain are inherently deceptive suggesting clear lines of demarcation in terms of
responsibility or focus however this is unlikely to be the case in today’s networked global
environment. The Australian government in its 2013 guide to national security document
(Department of Prime Minster and Cabinet, 2013, p. 10) clearly identified a range of functions
classified as national security and a range of agencies with aligning responsibilities and functions. In
the intelligence functions this included in addition to the AIC and defence capabilities the ACC, AFP,
ACBPS, DAFF, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Department of Health and Ageing,
Immigration, DFAT and PM&C. Whilst it may be argued that the primary intelligence function of
some of these agencies is not national security focused the government has recognised the potential
contribution to national security. It is likely that a similar argument could be made in relation to
grouping those intelligence capabilities across the domain that might contribute to targeting
organised crime. Effective intelligence sharing can only occur if and when agencies are aware of just
who is looking at what and why. A detailed map of the Australian Intelligence Domain offers that
opportunity.
CONCLUSION
The Australian Intelligence Domain consists of a large and diverse set of agencies and functional
areas situated within government departments federal and state. Whilst national security and law
enforcement continues to be the primary focus of the domain, intelligence support to the regulatory
and compliance functions of government have grown and are continuing to grow, to now represent
a significant component of the domain. This continued growth of the domain will see an increased
demand for graduates educated with more than the required graduate attributes of communication,
teamwork, critical appraisal skills, ideas generation and cross cultural awareness. Whilst the AIC,
defence and to a lesser degree law enforcement have the capacity to recruit a generalist graduates
and develop them in house the compliance and regulatory environment lacks that capacity.
Universities and the tertiary sector have an opportunity to step up and provide appropriately
educated graduates whom can step into an analyst role in the compliance and regulatory
environment to function effectively from day one.
Mapping the Australian Intelligence Domain will contribute to understanding of intelligence in an
Australian context. It will contribute to better collaboration and cooperation across the breadth and
depth of Australian intelligence. Moreover it will contribute to better informed debate and scholarly
research into and of the Australian Intelligence Domain.
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